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Ali Hüseyin Guluzade: Persian Motifs: The likelihood of war between the US and Iran. Why Trump will not succeed

Context

The situation surrounding Iran is once again experiencing one of its most acute phases of escalation. Following the failure of a large-scale information-hybrid war waged by the US and Israel against Iran in late 2025 and early 2026, the American side has fully revealed its true intentions: to coerce Tehran into a new nuclear deal.

In particular, the fact that a full-scale information-hybrid war was conducted against Iran by the “US-Israel” tandem – and subsequently failed – was simultaneously confirmed by several independent sources and experts in the field of information security.

Parallel to this, the US President Donald Trump continues to maintain the rhetoric that Iran has “little time” left to conclude a “fair and equitable” nuclear deal, which implies a complete renunciation of uranium enrichment and the return of IAEA inspectors to Iranian nuclear facilities.

These statements are accompanied by direct hints at a readiness to use force – such as “the next strike will be much worse” – referencing the June 2025 attacks (Operation “Midnight Hammer”) on Iranian nuclear facilities, which, according to Pentagon estimates, set the program back by one or two years.

“Trump’s Armada” and IRGC exercises

A key element of US pressure has been the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the US Central Command area of responsibility. It should be noted that on 25 January CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper held talks with IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir in Tel Aviv (Israel) regarding coordination against Iran and recent regional dynamics. In this context, Iran announced a NOTAM to close its airspace to drones and private aircraft for three months.

On January 26, the US group officially entered the Middle East region, accompanied by an announcement of multi-day aerial exercises aimed at demonstrating the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain combat aviation. These maneuvers are perceived as a signal to Tehran that the US is ready for operational action, including potential precision strikes.

The Iranian side responded in kind. The IRGC command had been conducting missile and air defense exercises in several cities, including Tehran and Shiraz, since early January, which was viewed as a demonstration of readiness to repel US attacks.

Iranian officials and military leaders themselves repeatedly warn that any strike on Iran will lead to “unpredictable consequences” for the entire region, including the possible involvement of Shia formations and the “Axis of Resistance.” It is emphasized that neighboring countries allowing their territory or airspace to be used will be considered hostile.

Diplomatic agenda

Iran’s diplomatic activity has also noticeably intensified in recent days. Contacts with Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and other regional players are clear confirmation of this.

Specifically, Turkish FM Hakan Fidan once again directly stated that a new US strike on Iran would be a “mistake,” and Saudi Arabia confirmed that it would not allow its territory to be used against Iran. Negotiations also took place between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Nevertheless, the Turkish side, chaired by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also held a National Security Council meeting. Even before that, reports emerged regarding Turkiye’s construction of a “buffer zone” along the Iranian border in case of a direct escalation of the Iran-US conflict.

Indirect external support for Iran can also be traced. In early January, Russia organized a series of heavy Il-76 cargo flights to Tehran, sparking speculation about the delivery of military equipment or other resources.

China, for its part, previously assisted the Iranian government in countering American Starlink systems during protests. Beijing has also openly stated that it will provide Iran with necessary information-technology support.

Additionally, regional players – Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, the UAE – are clearly striving to avoid a military scenario and are ready to play the role of mediators. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, for example, previously published material containing information about Erdoğan’s proposal to organize a trilateral meeting between Trump and Pezeshkian.

Current situation

In Trump’s team, judging by open sources, a hard line of “maximum pressure” dominates, with the goal of forcing Iran into negotiations rather than direct regime change. However, Trump’s team appears to lack an answer regarding the future of Iran should a regime change scenario actually succeed. During Senate hearings yesterday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that it is impossible to give a precise answer as to who might come to power in Iran after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

According to Al Arabiya, on January 27, the US sent a message to Iran demanding it not respond harshly in the event of an American strike; however, this request was rejected by the Iranian side. specifically, Ali Shamkhani, advisor to the Supreme Leader, called a limited attack an “illusion,” stating that any military action by the American side would be the “start of a war.”

Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Kazem Gharibabadi made similar statements, adding that negotiations with the US are not currently a priority for Iran.

Against this backdrop, according to recent reports – specifically from The New York Times and CNN – negotiations behind closed doors between the American and Iranian sides have reached an impasse, and Trump is now considering options for strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and representatives of the Iranian political and military establishment.

Key points:

➔ US demands to the Iranian side (cessation of uranium enrichment, limitation of medium- and long-range missile development, renunciation of proxy support) look like a de facto capitulation of the Islamic Republic. Tehran is unlikely to agree to this.
➔ Even a limited US strike will not lead to the fall of clerical rule in Iran, and the prospect of a protracted war could have unpredictable consequences not only for the Middle East.
➔ The potential killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would not yield any positive outcomes for the American side – on the contrary, it would further strengthen the motivation for resistance among pro-Iranian groups in the Middle East and the “unpredictability” factor.
➔ It is obvious that within Trump’s team itself, there is no consensus regarding the success of a hypothetical military operation regarding Iran. The true goal of the US is likely to force Tehran to sit at the negotiating table and unconditionally accept terms on a nuclear deal. It must be understood that the US did not initially pursue the goal of regime change in Iran, viewing it more as an optional solution. It is beneficial for Washington to have an Iran that is somewhat “predictable.”
➔ The overall picture so far demonstrates that the US and Iran are leaving a window for diplomacy, but military pressure remains maximal. Iran, in turn, demonstrates readiness for a harsh response while simultaneously activating regional channels for de-escalation. The risk of miscalculation is high, but open war is unlikely.
➔ US’s CENTCOM exercises in the Persian Gulf area and the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln, aside from the probability of starting clashes with Iran, are likely a strategy of direct pressure and intimidation of the Iranian side.
➔ Iran, specifically the IRGC, by conducting reciprocal exercises, once again demonstrates its readiness for an armed clash with the US and its allies in the Middle East. The IRGC, through its statements, makes it clear that a hypothetical war will lead to full-scale, unpredictable events throughout the Middle East. IRGC strikes could affect the South Caucasus territory in addition to the Gulf countries.
➔ The indirect factor of Russia and China cannot be ignored. Since the beginning of the calendar year, several flights of Russian aircraft to Iranian territory have been recorded, and China has assisted the Iranian side in terms of information-technology support.
➔ The US is most likely indeed leaving room for diplomacy, because it is obvious that even with a limited (but powerful strike designed to eliminate the top of the Iranian political and military establishment), one should not count on regime change. Nevertheless, judging by recent reports, closed-door negotiations are not yielding any positive progress.
➔ US actions regarding a strike on Iran are not supported by several key allies in the Middle East region, including Turkiye and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a potential US strike could lead to the activation of Shia cells in the Middle East, as well as unpredictable actions by the “Axis of Resistance.” On the other hand, the probable rise to power of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq, as well as the start of collecting signatures from Iraqi volunteers against a probable war with the US, further complicates the American position regarding freedom of action against Tehran.
➔ Iran, at least according to statements, is fully prepared for a full-scale war with the US and has even provided for flexible economic interaction and a replacement of cadres in the event of liquidations.

Scenarios:

● Under any scenario (full-scale military or limited), the prospect of the collapse of the IRI government is vague;
● A military scenario for solving the Iranian issue will be fruitless. It follows from this that the US might postpone a strike on Iran this time as well;
● The prospect of a “tanker war” analogous to the Venezuelan one also does not promise a 100% guarantee, as this could become the cause of direct confrontation and draw China – the main purchaser of Iranian oil – into the conflict;
● It is obvious that Iran will not back down from its intentions regarding the nuclear deal;
● The US may make some concessions to the Iranian side in the text of a new nuclear agreement or postpone the strike on Iran.

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