Israel’s recognition of the 1915 events in the Ottoman empire and its impact on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement agenda
Context
On June 28, 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of the State of Israel took an unprecedented political step by voting to officially recognize the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire as “genocide.” The initiative was put forward by Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, who presented the draft resolution to the cabinet late last week amid a sharp escalation in relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara. Following unanimous approval by the government, the document will be submitted for a final vote in the Israeli parliament — the Knesset.
Official statements by Israeli political leaders
Immediately after the cabinet vote, Gideon Saar emphasized the moral dimension of the decision, stating that “it is never too late to do the right thing.” The Israeli Foreign Minister expressed sincere gratitude to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and all relevant ministers for their unconditional support of the initiative.
According to Saar, this decision places Israel alongside the 32 countries worldwide that have already “fulfilled their moral duty to humanity by recognizing the historical truth and categorically rejecting any attempts to deny it.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also expressed a firm position on the issue. In an interview with *Ynet*, the Israeli premier officially confirmed his personal support for the draft resolution. When journalists directly asked him about the upcoming parliamentary discussion and rumors that he had previously blocked such recognition, Netanyahu gave a categorical response:
“I did not block it [the resolution] and I definitely support it.”
Hidden geopolitical motives and the regional balance of power
Despite the seemingly humanistic and historical rhetoric from Israeli officials, the Netanyahu government’s decision should be viewed exclusively through the lens of hard political calculation and the ongoing Turkish-Israeli confrontation.
Immediately after the news broke, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sharply criticized the Israeli government and accused it of attempting to cover up crimes in Gaza by raising the issue of recognizing the 1915 events. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again reminded that “those guilty of genocide in Gaza will certainly be held accountable.”
It should be noted that the “Armenian question” has traditionally been an extremely convenient and painful instrument of diplomatic pressure on Turkiye, which has historically rejected accusations regarding the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire and reacts sharply to any criticism on this topic.
Positions of Baku and Yerevan. Historical context
However, the so-called “Azerbaijani factor” plays an extremely important role in this complex diplomatic game between Tel Aviv and Ankara. Historically close and mutually beneficial ties between the Israeli and Azerbaijani authorities have noticeably cooled in recent times against the backdrop of the escalating international conflict surrounding Iran.
Overall, official Baku has been carefully and consistently avoiding open involvement in the aggressive anti-Iranian campaign of the Jewish state, at least since the beginning of the active phase of the conflict in late February 2026.
On the eve of these developments, during an official visit to the Azerbaijani capital, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, during an official reception with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, stated regarding bilateral relations that “Iran has learned during this conflict [with Israel] who is its friend and who is its enemy.”
Information about the negative attitude of Azerbaijani society toward the actions of the US-Israel coalition against Iran was previously published by *POLITICO*. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry did not respond to the outlet’s inquiry regarding the accuracy of this information.
Paradoxically, against the backdrop of such high-profile Israeli decisions, official Yerevan maintains emphasized and even detached restraint. At the time of writing, the Armenian Foreign Ministry has refrained from any public comments on the Israeli cabinet’s initiative. There is a logical basis for this: the current Armenian authorities and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have consciously and systematically reduced the importance of international recognition of the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire in order to avoid provoking conflict and complicating relations with the Azerbaijan-Turkiye bloc amid the ongoing institutionalization of peace and the restoration of relations with Turkiye.
The position of the Armenian authorities themselves also plays a significant role. Previously, Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly spoken about the need to reconsider historical realities in the context of the political-ideological concept of “Real Armenia.” In a recent address, he called for not using the topic of the 1915 events, contrasting it with the “peace agenda” and the security of Armenia’s sovereign territory.
Therefore, the Israeli démarche is unlikely to force Yerevan to reconsider its current political course of setting aside this issue in favor of normalizing relations with Baku and Ankara.
On the other hand, while the Knesset’s decision will leave a negative mark on Azerbaijan-Israel relations, it is unlikely to catastrophically reduce the level of ties between Baku and Tel Aviv.
Theses and scenarios
Medium-term scenarios (6–24 months)
– Israel’s recognition of the 1915 events will consolidate the current round of confrontation with Ankara, as the Turkish elite will continue to interpret Tel Aviv’s move as political and aimed at covering up the bloody events in Gaza, thereby intensifying mutual accusations of crimes against humanity. In the medium term, this will strengthen the trend toward the instrumentalization of historical traumas (1915 vs. Gaza 2023–2024) in regional rhetoric. However, it is unlikely to lead to a complete rupture of economic ties between Turkiye and Israel. Instead, relations will remain “coldly confrontational,” with episodic tactical contacts.
– Israel’s recognition of the 1915 events will inevitably cause symbolic irritation in Baku, given the close “Turkiye–Azerbaijan–Israel” triangle and Ankara’s role in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. However, the vital importance of Azerbaijani oil for Israel and the depth of military-technical cooperation (drones, intelligence, monitoring of Iran) make a sharp break highly unlikely. Baku will most likely shift to more restrained public rhetoric and avoid demonstrative steps with Israel, while preserving practical cooperation.
For the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace track, this means that Israel as an external factor will remain important, but its symbolic “rapprochement” with the Armenian narrative of 1915 will be offset by the pragmatism of bilateral Baku–Tel Aviv ties.
– Pashinyan’s and the Armenian Foreign Ministry’s line of reducing the priority of recognizing the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire in favor of concentrating on a peace treaty with Azerbaijan will most likely continue. This is because the “Real Armenia” ideology implies a reorientation from “historical Armenia” and the traumas of past years toward the security of the current territory.
– Israel’s recognition of the 1915 events will obviously be actively used by the Armenian revanchist opposition and the diaspora (in the West) to pressure the authorities. However, Yerevan is unlikely to change its course.
Long-term scenarios (3–10 years)
Scenario 1
Israel’s recognition of the 1915 events consolidates a long-term trend toward the mutual instrumentalization of traumas (1915, the Holocaust, Gaza) in the political discourse of Turkiye, Israel, and parts of the Arab world. Turkiye and its allies (Qatar, certain Islamic organizations) continue to build a political bloc in which Israel is fixed as a “genocidal state,” while 1915 becomes a field for retaliatory demonization of Israel (“covering up its crimes”).
In this scenario, the 1915 issue remains a threat to the Turkish-Armenian track, where each new wave of recognitions (by the US, Western countries, and now Israel) is perceived by Ankara as an instrument of pressure. This constrains political will for deep normalization with Yerevan. The Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agenda will depend on Yerevan’s readiness to finally remove the genocide question from the bilateral negotiating framework, leaving it in the symbolic and judicial spheres (UN, international forums) rather than in negotiations on borders, communications, and security.
Scenario 2
Over time, Israel’s recognition of 1915 becomes part of a broader contour, as most Western countries, plus Israel and parts of the Arab world, form a kind of normative consensus on qualifying the 1915 events as genocide. Turkiye remains in the position of denying the term “genocide,” but simultaneously promotes economic and transport cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan (corridors, energy, logistics) in exchange for the factual depoliticization of the 1915 topic in relations with Yerevan.
In this scenario, Armenia consolidates the “Real Armenia” concept as a strategic consensus: 1915 is recognized as historical truth and trauma, but does not serve as the basis for territorial claims. Priority is given to borders, infrastructure, and the security of the population in relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye. This, in turn, will facilitate the long-term conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan, in which issues related to 1915 do not figure at all — unlike the status of the border, mutual guarantees, refugee rights, and communications.
In this framework, Israel, by recognizing the 1915 events as “genocide,” may be perceived by Yerevan as a morally significant partner, but not as a key actor in the settlement. Israel’s influence on Baku will remain, but will more often manifest itself in the spheres of security and energy.
Scenario 3
If the conflictual situation and fragile peace between the US–Israel–Iran does not lead to sustainable stabilization but transitions into a prolonged phase of “hybrid” confrontation (drones, cyber operations, proxy conflicts), then:
– Turkiye, Iran, Qatar, and parts of the Islamic world may formalize an anti-Israel bloc, in which accusations of genocide in Gaza and support for the case at the ICJ become an institutional banner against Israel. The Jewish state, in turn, will rely on its alliance with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and a number of Western countries to contain Iran and its proxies.
– Azerbaijan will face increasing pressure: (1) from Iran in the context of preventing the deepening of Israel’s military presence in the South Caucasus; and (2) from Israel in the context of maintaining the level of strategic partnership.
Two sub-scenarios emerge here:
a) If Baku manages to continue balancing between Iran and Israel, the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process may develop as part of a broader format of regional de-escalation (transport corridors, trilateral formats with Turkiye and Iran), where the Israeli factor remains in the background but not at the center.
b) If the balance is disrupted (for example, due to new drone incidents or strikes on infrastructure), Azerbaijan may be forced to publicly distance itself from Israel. This would indirectly reduce its readiness for compromises with Armenia, which could be perceived as a potential partner of Israel on the 1915 issue. In that case, the peace process would acquire a more nervous character, with frequent setbacks and misunderstandings between the parties.
Sources:
1. Gideon Sa’ar | גדעון סער – https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/2071173111748161933
2. Netanyahu: I Definitely Support Recognition of Armenian Genocide – https://www.ynetnews.com/topics/Benjamin_Netanyahu
3. T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı – https://x.com/TC_Disisleri/status/2071300634125471870
4. SON DAKİKA! Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Gazze’de soykırımın hesabı sorulacak – https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/son-dakika-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-aciklamalarda-bulunuyor-3436338
5. Prezident İlham Əliyev Baqir Qalibafın başçılıq etdiyi nümayəndə heyətini qəbul edib – FOTO – VİDEO – https://oxu.az/siyaset/prezident-ilham-eliyev-baqir-qalibafin-basciliq-etdiyi-numayende-heyetini-qebul-edib-foto#:~:text=M%C9%99h%C9%99mm%C9%99d%20Baqir%20Qalibaf%20qeyd%20etdi%20ki%2C%20%C4%B0ran%20m%C3%BCharib%C9%99%20d%C3%B6vr%C3%BCnd%C9%99%20dostunu%20v%C9%99%20d%C3%BC%C5%9Fm%C9%99nini%20tan%C4%B1y%C4%B1b.%20Bu%20x%C3%BCsusda%2C%20dost%20%C3%B6lk%C9%99%20kimi%20Az%C9%99rbaycan%20%C4%B0ran%C4%B1n%20yan%C4%B1nda%20olub.
6. Diplomatic cables show Iran war is damaging US on multiple fronts across the world – https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/17/embassy-cables-detail-how-iran-war-is-hurting-the-us-abroad-00877205#:~:text=Undermining%20gains%20in%20Azerbaijan
7. Պետք է հասկանանք՝ ինչ է տեղի ունեցել և ինչու է տեղի ունեցել. Փաշինյանը՝ Ցեղասպանության մասին – https://civilnet.am/hy/news/813948
