In Western political and media discourse, particularly in the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran has long been portrayed as a state fundamentally driven by anti-Americanism. While this narrative reflects certain aspects of the deep political and ideological disagreements between the two countries, it has often been amplified to such an extent that the role of U.S. policies in creating and sustaining this confrontation has been largely overlooked.
A review of the history of U.S.–Iran relations suggests that, at various moments, the Iranian government has pursued efforts to reduce tensions and manage disputes through diplomacy. Iran’s indirect cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, diplomatic engagement over Iraq, years of nuclear negotiations, and ultimately the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) all demonstrate that Iranian foreign policy has not been defined exclusively by confrontation. On several occasions, Tehran has sought dialogue and negotiated settlements.
Conversely, many Iranians point to the 1953 coup d’état, decades of U.S. support for the Pahlavi monarchy, political and intelligence assistance to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, extensive economic sanctions, the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the continuation of the “maximum pressure” campaign as evidence that a persistent pattern of institutional hostility toward Iran exists within the American political establishment.
From this perspective, one may argue that the dominant Western narrative frequently presents Iranian anti-Americanism as the principal source of the conflict while paying considerably less attention to the role of U.S. policies in shaping decades of mutual distrust. As a result, Iranian actions are often interpreted primarily through an ideological lens, whereas American actions are commonly framed as matters of national security or strategic necessity. “continue in comments”
