Ali Hüseyin Guluzade: The Crisis Between the Armenian Authorities and the Church Deepens (Beginning of winter 2025)

Late autumn and early winter of 2025 marked another ongoing spiral of tension between the Armenian authorities and the Church. This analytical piece will discuss the outcomes of this confrontation, the positions of the parties involved, and probable scenarios.
Schism, intelligence services, and “Agents of Influence”

On November 27, 2025, a group of eight AAC (Armenian Apostolic Church) hierarchs met with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who thanked them for their “principled stance” against the Catholicos. By November 29, 10 archbishops and bishops (including the Primate of the Western Diocese of the USA, Hovnan Derderian) publicly called on Karekin II to abdicate, accusing him of arbitrariness and politicizing the Church.
In response, on December 1, imprisoned Archbishops Bagrat Galstanyan and Mikael Ajapahyan issued a harsh letter, calling their colleagues’ actions “vile betrayal” and urging their removal from diocesan administration.
In turn, the Armenian authorities have openly admitted to interfering in spiritual affairs. Thus, on December 3, speaking from the parliamentary rostrum, Nikol Pashinyan stated that a “network of agents of influence” had been uncovered within the clergy in Armenia, hinting at their ties to the KGB and foreign intelligence services. In particular, he directly accused the Catholicos’s brother, Archbishop Ezras Nersisyan (Primate of the Russian Diocese of the AAC), of working for (Russian) intelligence services.
A day later, on December 4, Pashinyan essentially confirmed media reports regarding pressure on clerics. Answering journalists’ questions, he did not deny that NSS [National Security Service] officers “ask” priests not to mention Karekin II’s name during liturgies he attends, arguing that “we do not consider Nersisyan [legitimate]…” (referring to Karekin II by his lay name). Pashinyan also added that mentioning the Patriarch’s name poses a security threat.
On the same day, 27 AAC archbishops and bishops (later joined by a 28th) issued a joint statement calling the authorities’ actions dangerous interference and expressing unconditional support for Karekin II. They emphasized that a liturgy without mentioning the Catholicos’s name is a canonical violation and a step toward schism.
In turn, on December 7, the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem called for the convocation of the National Ecclesiastical Assembly—the Church’s supreme governing body—to resolve the crisis. That same day, the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin announced that the Episcopal Assembly scheduled for December 10–12 had been postponed.
The “Backpack Case” and the arrests of hierarchs

On December 4, Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan, Chancellor of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, was detained in Iravan. Notably, prior to his arrest, Khachatryan had harshly criticized Prime Minister N. Pashinyan’s methods regarding the Church.
On December 5, the court, presided over by Judge Masis Melkonyan, granted the investigation’s motion to arrest the prelate for two months. He was placed in the NSS “Yerevan-Kentron” detention center, where his cellmates turned out to be the leader of the “Sacred Struggle” movement, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, and the Primate of the Shirak Diocese, Mikael Ajapahyan.
The newspaper Hraparak would later note in an insider article that Archbishop Khachatryan was “moved in” with Galstanyan and Ajapahyan for wiretapping purposes.
As for the motives, the Investigative Committee of Armenia charged the Archbishop with drug trafficking. According to the investigation’s version released on December 5, in 2018, Khachatryan allegedly instructed his deacon and an unidentified person to plant marijuana in the backpack of an activist protesting against the Catholicos as part of the “New Armenia — New Patriarch” movement, in order to discredit the protest.
The Investigative Committee also claims that the deacon photographed the backpack and sent the photo to the Archbishop via Viber, after which the police were called. The defense and the Archbishop himself called the accusations absurd, pointing to the expiration of the statute of limitations and the obvious political motivation.
In general, Khachatryan essentially became the fourth high-ranking AAC hierarch to be imprisoned. Already in pre-trial detention are the leader of the “Sacred Struggle” movement, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan; the Primate of the Shirak Diocese, Mikael Ajapahyan; and Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan.

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Meanwhile, on December 6, upon returning from a patriarchal visit to France, Catholicos Karekin II stated at Zvartnots Airport—where he was met by hundreds of supporters with applause—that Khachatryan had been arrested on fabricated charges. Etchmiadzin also officially condemned the arrest, calling it a continuation of repressions and persecution against the Church.
Events at the “Seven Wounds” church

The events of December 7 in Gyumri, on the day of remembrance for the victims of the Spitak earthquake (1988), became another wave of tension between the authorities and the church. For the first time in 200 years, the bells did not ring at the Church of the Holy Mother of God (popularly known as “Seven Wounds”).
The temple was cordoned off by reinforced police details and officers of the National Security Service (NSS) of the RA to secure the visit of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan, and President Vahagn Khachaturyan. The day before, the local clergy of the Shirak Diocese, remaining loyal to the Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II, refused to conduct a service in violation of the canon (the authorities demanded not to mention the Catholicos’s name) and locked the church doors; however, control over the building was later taken by security forces.
As a result, the liturgy for the government representatives was conducted by Priest Mkrtich Mushadyan, specially brought in from the Armavir Diocese. The service was attended by so-called “schismatic hierarchs” who had previously spoken out against Karekin II:

● Primate of the Ararat Diocese, Navasard Kchoyan;
● Bishops Gevork Saroyan, Sion Adamyan, and Archbishop Vazgen Mirzakhanyan.

In turn, a clergyman of the church, Husik Grigoryan, called the incident a “forcible takeover.”
In parallel, priests of the Shirak Diocese held a canonical service at the neighboring Church of the Holy Saviour, where many believers gathered, having also boycotted the pro-government liturgy.
Later, summarizing the visit, RA Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan made a resonant statement that the time had come to hold a liturgy in Etchmiadzin, which the Armenian opposition interpreted as a direct threat. For example, leader of the “Bright Armenia” party Edmon Marukyan characterized the events in Gyumri as a “rehearsal for the seizure of the Cathedral” using police guards and touring groups of loyal clerics. Leader of the “Armenia Alliance” bloc Robert Kocharyan, voicing his versions regarding the confrontation between the government and the church, said the goal is singular—to destroy one of the most important pillars of Armenian identity. Meanwhile, several Western-funded Armenian NGOs also spoke out against the methods and actions of the Armenian authorities regarding the AAC.
Pashinyan’s “roadmap”

During this period, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was noted for several secular-reformist statements. Thus, the very next day after the events at the “Seven Wounds” church in Gyumri, on December 8, 2025, the Armenian Prime Minister proposed installing state flags in Armenian churches. He also presented a “roadmap” for updating the AAC.
According to Pashinyan’s vision, the proposed “roadmap” implies launching the process following the resignation of the Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II. This initiative includes three components:
– Appointment of an interim head of the patriarchal see in accordance with current AAC procedures;
– Approval of an AAC charter;
Holding elections for the Catholicos of All Armenians based on a new canon.
In turn, the Armenian government has already expressed readiness to assist in drafting the church charter.
Key takeaways

– As of late December 2025, the most likely outcome remains the base scenario—the gradual squeezing out of the Church’s old hierarchy by the authorities and the creation of a loyal church while maintaining the appearance of unity. That is, a scenario in which Etchmiadzin remains in the hands of Karekin II, but without actual influence and with a gradual loss of clout.
– A full forcible seizure of Etchmiadzin remains a backup option for Pashinyan, which may be used only if control over the situation is lost.
– The chance for compromise is minimal without serious external intervention or a domestic political crisis. The situation remains extremely dynamic, and another spiral of tension will most likely occur in the second half of January – early February 2026.