The protests that have unfolded outside several schools in Baku initially appear to be yet another conflict over religious clothing – the hijab. However, on 12 October 2026 the dispute over the hijab rapidly moved beyond schoolyards and turned into a broader debate about the limits of Azerbaijani secularism, freedom of conscience, and the state’s right to regulate the public expression of religious identity.
Context
The formal source of the crisis was Decision No. 309 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan, dated 21 September 2026. The document does not contain the word “hijab,” but it prohibits elements of clothing that disrupt the uniformity of the school uniform or do not correspond to the “principle of the secular character of general education.” Control over compliance was assigned to pedagogical councils, and parents are now obliged to ensure that their children follow the rules. It was precisely the gap between the wording of the resolution and the practice of its application that became the cause of the conflict.
On 12 October 2026, in a number of Baku schools, girls wearing hijabs began to be denied access to classes. The restrictions also affected some female teachers. In response, students and parents gathered outside school buildings, boycotted lessons, and held symbolic classes on the street.
Overall, reports came from traditionally conservative Baku villages (Balakhani, Nardaran, Mashtaga, Balajari), and other districts of Baku, as well as from Masally and some other parts of the Republic. A day later, Azerbaijani law enforcement agencies detained until 200 people in the area of the “28 May” metro station in central Baku.
Position of the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers and Legal Assessment
The Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers views the situation primarily as a matter of enforcing a uniform dress code and protecting the secular character of the state school. On the eve of the detentions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan reported the arrest of 37 people, citing conflicts with school staff, damage to property, obstruction of traffic, and disruption of the work of educational institutions. A criminal case has been opened under Article 233 of the Criminal Code.
There were also reports of the arson of a school director’s car and an attempt to set fire to another educational institution. Later, the State Security Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan detained individuals in Masazir involved in the arson of vehicles.
The legal side of the conflict is more complex than a simple opposition between Islam and the secular state. The Constitution of Azerbaijan simultaneously enshrines the secular character of the state education system, the right to education, and freedom of conscience.
Consequently, the key (moral-ethical) question is not whether the state may regulate school clothing, but whether the complete denial of access to a girl wearing a hijab is a truly necessary and proportionate measure.
An additional problem is created by the vagueness of the concept of “non-compliance with the principle of secularism,” which in essence allows for differing application of the rules in different schools.
Historical Retrospective
In 2010-2011, an earlier attempt by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan to introduce a unified school dress code already led to protests by supporters of the hijab. At that time, official discourse also linked the mobilization to foreign, primarily Iranian influence.
Today, pro-government Azerbaijani media and commentators are once again speaking of external coordination and an information campaign against Azerbaijan. It should be noted that an anti-Azerbaijani manipulative campaign has indeed originated and continues to originate from Azerbaijani-language and other media controlled from third countries.
However, it is important to observe that the foreign exploitation of the topic still does not exclude the existence of a domestic social base for the protest. Indeed, anti-Azerbaijani solidarity actions with the protesters took place in Turkiye, while platforms linked to Iran covered the events of the protests in their traditionally negative manner.
Nevertheless, it should also be taken into account that there is so far no publicly available independent evidence that the Iranian side specifically organized the school boycotts or violent episodes inside Azerbaijan; there is only the fact of an information war between Baku and Tehran, and between Baku and Ankara. In other words, external informational amplification and direct management of the protests should be distinguished, as these are different phenomena.
Russian media and Telegram channels have also not remained on the sidelines, seeing in the protests a Turkish “pan-Turkic” and “neo-Ottoman” trace. While Iran and Turkiye (some circles) are united by a common propaganda thesis regarding “Azerbaijani-Israeli friendship,” their ideological interests in Azerbaijan differ. For Turkiye it is meanwhile “political Islamism”, while for Iran it is “Shiite brotherhood”.
Theses and narratives
Objectively, the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan is clearly contradictory, ambiguous, controversial, and in some respects provocative.
Overall, historical practice with Iran and Afghanistan in the 1970s, as well as with Turkiye in the 1980s-1990s, shows that even the slightest attempt to manipulate the dogmas of Islam, not to mention direct radical methods by the state against the Muslim conservative stratum of society, produces an asymmetric effect, further deepening contradictions both within society and between the state and society.
The reason for such a sharp and instantaneous adoption of a law that effectively bans the wearing of the hijab by the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers still requires analysis.
It is difficult to assess the non-obvious factors that prompted the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers to adopt such a hasty and radical decision banning the wearing of the hijab in schools without preparing an alternative for girls who wear the hijab (for example, transferring them to special institutions from the next academic year). This creates the impression that the Cabinet of Ministers did not fully realistically assess the risks of the adopted decision and, at a minimum, does not possess factual information “on the ground.”
Taking into account the narratives of Azerbaijani pro-government media, commentators, and other opinion leaders, as well as their main argumentation that “those who wear the hijab have no place in a secular school,” one can conclude that these individuals:
a) completely do not understand the meaning and significance of the words they utter;
b) do not fully understand the dogmas of Islam (above all, “fiqh”).
The implementation of the law by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan has obviously and covertly, but in fact, aggravated (and, should the situation continue, will further aggravate) the situation in Azerbaijani society.
The implementation of the law has, in effect, in a single moment deprived Azerbaijani schoolgirls of school education and potentially made them victims of manipulation by third countries (primarily Iran and even certain interested circles in Turkiye).
The situation that has arisen will at least be perceived contradictorily by the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf; it will also provoke an ambiguous reaction from Turkiye and Iran.
Even if third countries (Iran, Turkiye, and others) are indeed not directly involved in the current events (excluding the media space), it is obvious that the topic of the hijab ban in Azerbaijani schools will now be exploited in their propaganda against Azerbaijan should the actual situation continue.
Scenarios and risks
Scenario 1: Further development of the crisis will depend on the decisions of pedagogical councils and the reaction of the security forces in Baku. A compromise would be, for example, permission to wear a hijab coordinated in color with the school uniform. Such a step could reduce tension.
Scenario 2: Continuation of denials of access, mass detentions, and the transfer of the dispute into the plane of “foreign interference,” on the contrary, are capable of turning a local conflict over clothing into a broader crisis of trust between the state and the religious part of society, which in Azerbaijan is still the majority.
