Ali Hüseyin Guluzade: PERSIAN MOTIFS – TRUMP’S BET AND MOJTABA KHAMENEI

Against the backdrop of the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran, the issue of appointing a new Supreme Leader of Iran is becoming increasingly urgent. Among the candidates, Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stands out in particular, in whom the United States and President Trump personally see another problem. However, against the backdrop of alternative candidates, the Iranian Council of Experts will one of these days choose a new Supreme Leader, on whom much will depend on the further course of not only the war, but also the future of Iran.

TRUMP AS A FACTOR

In his recent statement to CNN, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the United States should participate in the selection of the new Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). At the same time, he essentially excluded the candidacy of Mojtaba Khamenei — the son of the late Supreme Leader (Rahbar) of the IRI, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is considered the most likely successor.

It should be noted that Mojtaba Khamenei, who for many years remained “in the shadow” of the Iranian military-political elite, enjoys substantial support from the IRGC and popularity among most politicians, including clerics.

As for his political profile and stance, M. Khamenei belongs to the conservative wing. If rumors of his potential appointment by the Assembly of Experts of the IRI are confirmed, the United States and Israel will be dealing not only with a conservative Supreme Leader backed by the military elite, but also with a man who has personal motives for confronting the American-Israeli coalition. Naturally, in such a case the war could drag on for several months. It is therefore no coincidence that Trump specifically named M. Khamenei as “unsuitable.”

Another candidate is the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran — Hassan Khomeini. In his views, he belongs more to the “moderate” reformist wing of the Iranian political system. Moreover, H. Khomeini has repeatedly criticized the shortcomings of the system and the policies of the IRI leadership.

Incidentally, since the end of the two-day war and the beginning of the current conflict, H. Khomeini has repeatedly appeared in public and made statements. He has been awaiting the position of Supreme Leader at least since 2018. According to some rumors, the position of the late Rahbar Ali Khamenei was one of the main reasons why Hassan Khomeini’s candidacy was not considered by the Assembly of Experts. That obstacle no longer exists.

ISSUES SURROUNDING KHAMENEI’S CANDIDACY

Electing M. Khamenei would contradict the Islamic doctrine of “Velayat-e Faqih,” both de facto and de jure, on several fundamental points:

1) As a religious authority, M. Khamenei is less popular in clerical circles and does not hold the status of Ayatollah — the highest religious rank required for the office of Rahbar of the Islamic Republic. By the way, this point can be easily resolved if we take into account the fact that at the time of the election of the late Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader(1989), he also did not have the status of Ayatollah.

2) Potential election of Mojtaba Khamenei would effectively disregard the prohibition on hereditary succession of power (essentially a monarchy) — one of the core principles of “Velayat-e Faqih” that Ruhollah Khomeini himself strongly emphasized.

3) Electing Mojtaba Khamenei “by inheritance” could trigger controversial religious-ideological associations with the doctrine of “Velayat-e Faqih” and among followers of other Muslim madhhabs as a counter-argument (especially Sunnism). Specifically, it evokes the sensitive chapter of early Islamic history under the Umayyads (661–750 CE), when the principle of father-to-son power transfer began — a development that ultimately led to the tragic events in Karbala (Iraq), a date of profound significance for Shia Islam.

SCENARIOS. WHAT HAPPENS IF THEY ELECT:

– Mojtaba Khamenei [HIGH PROBABILITY] The most likely scenario, strongly supported by the military elite. The war would most likely continue for at least 4 to 6 months. If the US and Israel decide to cease operations, Iran’s domestic political situation under M. Khamenei would at minimum remain unchanged from the pre-war period; at maximum, conservatism and the repressive apparatus would intensify in the postwar era.

– Ali Reza Arafi [MEDIUM/LOW] The appointment of Arafi cannot be entirely ruled out. He is viewed as a purely religious figure and bureaucrat who handled administrative matters for the late Rahbar Ali Khamenei and would certainly not obstruct the IRGC. However, in the long term this could weaken the theological dimension in Iranian society and provoke discontent within the religious establishment due to Arafi’s relatively low popularity.

– Hassan Khomeini [LOW] Although H. Khomeini has long been considered a possible contender for Rahbar, he lacks support from the IRGC — a decisive factor for any Iranian politician. Furthermore, in the current situation, Iran most likely requires tough and decisive leadership at all levels of power.

– Another reformist candidate [MEDIUM/LOW] — former presidents Hassan Rouhani or Mohammad Khatami. The main obstacle is the IRGC. Both belong to the reformist camp, and under present conditions their stance could easily be labeled “defeatist.”

– Alternative scenario Appointment of a placeholder “Rahbar X” followed by his elimination by the US-Israel coalition in order to advance a more favorable candidate and soften Iran’s negotiating position. The risk for the United States and Israel lies in the potential for greater radicalization of the IRGC, increased provocation, and a surge of hatred from Iranian society and Shia populations across the Middle East.