Denis Korkodinov: A coup d’état was being prepared in Kyrgyzstan

The detention on February 16, 2026, of Sydyk, a senior operative of the 6th Directorate of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), nicknamed “Pito,” who was in the inner circle of Eldar Zhakypbekov, the already arrested head of the capital’s security service department, put a final point on the most high-profile intra-elite conflict in modern Kyrgyz history. We are talking about preventing an attempt to violently seize power, which was being prepared by high-ranking officials of the State Committee for National Security.

The string of high-profile resignations and arrests of Kyrgyz SCNS employees caught many Western observers off guard, who were accustomed to considering the regime of Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev a monolithic tandem. However, a monstrous betrayal was brewing behind the facade of friendship. It was not just about the resignation of an influential security official undergoing treatment in Munich, but about a deeply conspiratorial plot, the threads of which led to the 6th and 9th services of the SCNS, as well as to foreign consultants from private military companies affiliated with Western intelligence agencies. The “Heir” (Naslednik) plan allegedly involved the elimination of Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov between February 15 and 20, followed by the transfer of power to a provisional National Salvation Council.

According to information received from the military attaché of one of the CSTO countries in Bishkek, under the guise of collecting signatures for early elections (the so-called “Letter of the 75”), the conspirators were working out a mechanism to delegitimize the current government. The plan was to declare Japarov’s tenure illegitimate by exploiting the constitutional crisis and disputes over the length of his term (elected under the old constitution for 6 years, but governing under the new one with a 5-year term).

The version about the involvement of foreign intelligence services, which at first seemed conspiratorial, is now being supported by facts. Three sources in the diplomatic corps immediately confirm that in January 2026, there was an abnormal increase in the number of visits to Bishkek by employees of the British Embassy not accredited as diplomats, as well as representatives of non-governmental foundations associated with democratic initiatives. Moreover, Russian experts from the Institute of CIS Countries point to strange business trips to Munich, where Tashiev was being treated, by US security advisors. They allegedly needed a president loyal to the West who would reconsider Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the EAEU and close the loopholes for circumventing anti-Russian sanctions that so irritate Brussels and Washington.

Sadyr Japarov’s reaction was swift and harsh. Realizing that the SCNS had become a “state within a state,” he not only fired Tashiev but also, within hours, dismantled the very structure that could have become a springboard for rebellion. The removal of the Border Service from the committee’s subordination and the creation of a separate State Protective Service (SGO) based on the 9th Service, reporting directly to the president, deprived the conspirators of the ability to control not only the borders but also the physical protection of the top officials. However, the arrests were the most significant blow. The detention of Zhakypbekov on February 15, and the next day his subordinate Sydyk, whom colleagues characterized as an “executor of delicate assignments,” showed that the president did not intend to stop halfway. They were followed by the dismissal of the head of the SCNS for Osh and the region, which was critically important, as the southern region is considered Tashiev’s fiefdom and it was from there that the threat of mobilizing his supporters for a march on Bishkek could have originated.

Exclusive data sheds light on the role of speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, who resigned on February 12. According to the “Heir” plan, he, as a Tashiev supporter, was supposed to announce the transfer of power to himself as acting president during the early elections. However, the conspiratorial version discussed in expert circles (that he might “play along with Tashiev” or start his own game) collapsed against reality: Japarov outmaneuvered his opponents by securing the support of the parliamentary majority and electing a new speaker, Marlen Mamataliev, known for his loyalty. This was a political knockout for the conspirators: the constitutional lever for power transition was knocked out of their hands before they could even use it.

Meanwhile, the situation in Bishkek remains outwardly calm, but internally — explosive. On February 17, the Constitutional Court was supposed to provide clarifications on the presidential term, and this decision could have been a detonator if the plot had not been suppressed. President Japarov, speaking to security forces the day before, stated that “the country needs to be governed with the head, not with force,” and that there are no prerequisites for a coup, as he personally controls the situation 20 hours a day. However, this phrase reveals nervousness: the head of state, who has survived an attempt on his power from within his own “citadel,” is forced to personally delve into operational work, now trusting no one.

British foundations allegedly worked closely with the so-called “activists” from among the signatories of the “Letter of the 75,” training them in methods of non-violent resistance and digital security. The technologies were the same as in the “color revolutions,” but the customer, most likely, were internal players who bought into the promises of Western support. However, some SCNS employees responsible for cybersecurity and dismissed during the purge (for example, the deputy head of the Cybersecurity Center) could most likely have maintained contacts with foreign colleagues, passing them data on allegedly impending election fraud to create an information backdrop for Japarov’s illegitimacy.

Kyrgyzstan’s military intelligence, which is traditionally in the shadow of the SCNS, has intensified its work in the southern regions — Osh and Jalal-Abad — these days. Attempts at provocations on ethnic grounds are being recorded there, which could have been instigated by Tashiev’s supporters to divert the authorities’ attention. Destabilization on the border, a new round of conflict, could have created ideal conditions for the introduction of troops ostensibly to “protect civilians,” but in fact to seize power in the center. This was precisely avoided thanks to preemptive arrests. The detention of Zhakypbekov, who was responsible for the capital, destroyed the coordination between the “southern” wing of the plot and the executors in Bishkek.

In the context of the international reaction, it is noteworthy that on February 13, the new speaker Mamataliev held telephone conversations with the Chairman of the Russian State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, accepting an invitation to visit Moscow. This suggests that Russia, concerned about a possible change of power and loss of control over the situation in a strategically important ally, promptly “voted” for Japarov’s legitimacy. Moscow needs stability on the southern borders of the CSTO, and it is ready to support Japarov if he can hold the helm and carry out a purge without civil war. At the same time, the activity of Kazakh and Uzbek diplomacy, the calls from Tokayev and the visit of Mirziyoyev indicate that neighbors were also frightened by the prospect of chaos in Kyrgyzstan, which would inevitably spill across the borders.

The most dramatic figure in this whole story is Kamchybek Tashiev. Being in Germany, he found himself cut off from his associates. In his comment, he expressed regret that he was not allowed to say goodbye to the personnel, but this already looks like an attempt to save face. The question of his return remains open. If he returns, he may face the fate of many Kyrgyz politicians — from Atambayev to other ex-presidents — criminal charges and prison. If he does not return, he will become another political émigré, but with enormous influence in the south, which leaves a time bomb under the foundation of Japarov’s regime.

It is indicative that the coup plan was uncovered not by foreign partners, but by internal forces, which indicates the presence of healthy elements in the system. However, the depth of penetration of the conspirators into the SCNS structures, their ties with the criminal underworld, and attempts to enlist the support of external players paint a picture of an extremely unstable statehood. President Japarov now faces the task of not simply retaining power, but of carrying out such reforms so that no “general” will ever again want, or be able, to repeat the “Heir” attempt.

Denis Korkodinov, CEO of the International Center for Political Analysis and Forecasting “DIIPETES”