The Issue of Lake Urmia’s Drying on the Eve of the Official Visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Republic of Azerbaijan

This report summarises the latest data regarding the current state, restoration efforts, and ongoing challenges of Lake Urmia (April 2025) in the context of warming Iran-Azerbaijan relations.

I. Legal Status

Lake Urmia, located in northwestern Iran within the Turkic provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, is the largest lake in Western Asia and the sixth-largest saltwater lake in the world, historically covering an area of 5,000–6,000 km². Since 1975, the lake has been designated a Ramsar site and a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.

II. History and Potential Threats

Historically, Lake Urmia has significantly shrunk, losing over 90% of its area since 1995 (1). By autumn 2023, it had almost dried up, transforming into a vast salt flat, influenced by factors such as prolonged droughts, agricultural water use, and the construction of dams on feeder rivers.

It is noteworthy that the drying of Lake Urmia has ecological and health consequences not only for Iran but also for neighbouring countries, causing air quality issues (2) related to dust and respiratory diseases among the region’s population (3).

This, in turn, has led to increased salinity, threatening the biodiversity of migratory birds such as flamingos, as well as agriculture. The situation with Lake Urmia bears some resemblance to the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea (historically regarded as a sea) (4).

III. Current State (April 2025)

Since the early 2000s, Lake Urmia has faced severe ecological challenges, primarily due to drought, agricultural water diversion, and climate change.

According to Iranian media reports (5), the lake’s area in April 2025 was 1,140 km², down from 1,350 km² on the same date in 2024. The water level stood at 1,270.28 metres, lower than the 1,270.34 metres recorded the previous year, while the volume was 1.63 billion cubic metres compared to 1.8 billion cubic metres in 2024. This decline is attributed to a 49.6% reduction in spring precipitation compared to the previous year.

However, earlier media reports provided specific figures. For example, on 8 March 2025, it was reported that the lake’s water volume had increased by 80 million cubic metres to 1.63 billion cubic metres (6), likely reflecting a seasonal rise compared to the February figure of 1.55 billion cubic metres (7). Specifically, on 29 January 2025, reports indicated the lake’s level rose from 1,270.05 metres to 1,270.13 metres, with the volume increasing to 1.24 billion cubic metres, up by 0.19 billion cubic metres from the previous year (8). These figures highlight fluctuations.

From the data, it is clear that some recovery in volume was observed early in 2025, but by April, the lake’s area had significantly decreased, likely due to seasonal evaporation and low precipitation.

Some open-source reports corroborate this trend. For instance, a source from 10 April 2025 reported that the lake had restored its former volume thanks to rainfall and water releases from dams (9), while another from 13 April 2025 warned of a critical state and concerns over further area reduction due to seasonal evaporation (10).

According to the latest official data, the General Director of the West Azerbaijan Regional Water Company, Majid Dastgahi, reported that Lake Urmia’s area had decreased by 210 square kilometres (11).

IV. Restoration Efforts and International Support

It cannot be said that the Iranian government has taken no steps towards restoring the lake’s former volume; rather, the measures and political will over the years have been insufficient. For example, on 16 April 2025, Shahin Jahangiri, the representative of Urmia city in the Iranian parliament, claimed that the lake is being destroyed by non-functional dams (12).

For instance, in 2013, the Lake Urmia Restoration Programme (ULRP) was launched, aiming to stabilise, restore, and sustainably manage the lake by 2024 (13).

Iran’s international cooperation in this area includes securing funding from Japan amounting to 690,000,000 yen (approximately $5,000,000) for managing the lake’s wetlands (14), as well as collaboration with the UNDP and FAO to promote sustainable agricultural practices. Recently, Japan reportedly invested an additional $3,000,000 in the lake’s restoration (15). Other initiatives mentioned in open sources include the cultivation of artemia to support the lake’s ecosystem (16).

V. Political Context

The drying of Lake Urmia, situated in the historical territory of South Azerbaijan, periodically emerges as a concern among both Iranian Azerbaijanis (historically often referred to as Turks in Iran) and Azerbaijanis of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In particular, there is a widely held belief in Baku that the lake is being deliberately dried up by Iranian authorities, a view supported by numerous Azerbaijani state deputies (17). Media reports also occasionally highlight the plundering of the lake’s salt by Iranian authorities, as documented by local eyewitnesses (18).

It is significant that the Iranian government regards the Lake Urmia issue as an internal matter. However, Iranian experts assert that the drying problem is also linked to ecological sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic (19).

As for the senior political leadership of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including President Ilham Aliyev, the issue of Lake Urmia’s drying has not been mentioned in official or unofficial media to date. This is particularly striking given that Baku recently hosted the UN Climate Conference (COP-29), which resulted in key environmental protection decisions and commitments from Azerbaijan.

VI. Actions of the New Iranian Government

The new Iranian government, led by President Masoud Pezeshkian, an ethnic Azerbaijani Turk, has intensified diplomatic efforts internationally since taking power. This activity has extended to the South Caucasus, notably through significant improvements in Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the signing of important bilateral trade and economic agreements since early 2025.

In this context, the anticipated visit of the Iranian president to Azerbaijan on 27 April 2025 (20), accompanied by a delegation of 110 people, and his meeting with Ilham Aliyev, could serve as a logical conclusion to unresolved issues and potentially reset relations between Baku and Tehran.

Regarding Lake Urmia, Pezeshkian pledged to restore the lake in August 2024 (21), and in March 2025, it was reported that he intends to involve foreign experts in this effort (22) (23).

Theses

📌 The prospects for restoring Lake Urmia remain uncertain. Seasonal fluctuations clearly play a significant role in restoration success. While an increase in volume was observed early in 2025, the April decline underscores vulnerability to evaporation and low precipitation.

📌 Contradictions include debates over the effectiveness of the Iranian government’s restoration efforts, with some studies suggesting that climatic factors were primarily responsible for past failures.

📌 Although Iran views Lake Urmia’s restoration as an internal issue, an ecological catastrophe would undoubtedly impact the ethno-geo-political landscape of Western Asia, extending beyond the Islamic Republic’s domestic concerns.

📌 It remains unclear whether Ilham Aliyev will raise the possibility of assisting Iran with Lake Urmia’s restoration during talks with Masoud Pezeshkian, particularly in the context of Azerbaijan’s COP29 presidency.

Forecasts

🔘 Based on his actions and statements, Iranian President M. Pezeshkian is likely to take concrete steps towards restoring Lake Urmia.

🔘 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev may broach the topic of mutual assistance to Iran regarding Lake Urmia’s restoration during the visit of Iranian President M. Pezeshkian.

🔘 Should Iran respond positively, Azerbaijan might dispatch an expert team, or a joint Iran-Azerbaijan commission could be established to address Lake Urmia’s restoration.