Significant reasons negatively affecting the signing of the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2025
In March 2025, Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the agreement on the text of the peace treaty. This report analyzes the current situation, key obstacles, international and domestic factors, as well as future prospects, based on available information and provided theses.

I. Current status of negotiations. Contentious issues
On March 13, 2025, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the completion of negotiations on the text of the agreement on peace and the establishment of interstate relations (1).
This was a historic breakthrough after decades of tension, but as is now evident: the signing will still be delayed due to Armenia’s implementation of conditions such as changes to the Armenian Constitution and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group.
International and regional actors, as well as political and economic organizations, predictably welcomed this news positively, and German Foreign Minister Annabella Baerbock even praised the Armenian leadership for their “bold concessions.” (2)
In particular, despite significant progress after the Second Karabakh War, several issues remain unresolved, as confirmed by the theses on the ineffectiveness of the hypothetical peace treaty:

Amendment of the Armenian Constitution. Azerbaijan insists on removing from the preamble of the Armenian Constitution mentions that effectively imply territorial claims. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev continues to state that this “clearly represents a territorial threat.”
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, in turn, is preparing to hold a referendum on amending the Constitution, but the date remains unknown (likely to take place in the summer of 2026).
Dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Although both countries express agreement, and the latest statements by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan about the admissibility of dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group only after signing the peace agreement (3), there are no clear actions from Iravan on this issue yet.

II. Non-obvious issues
It is commonly believed that the two aforementioned issues are currently the main factors hindering the conclusion of an agreement between Baku and Iravan. However, besides them, there are actually very significant strategic issues on the table, without resolving which the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process may finally escalate and turn into direct military confrontation.
Zangezur corridor. This strategic route connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory was excluded from the treaty text for discussion at a later stage in August 2024.
In Armenia, this road is called the “Crossroads of Peace,” and its implementation is viewed by the authorities as a regular road on which customs duties should be imposed (albeit with a simplified procedure). However, Azerbaijan continues to insist on its opening and the principle of free movement, referring to the 9th point of the trilateral agreement of November 10, 2020, which raises concerns in Armenia about loss of sovereignty. Pashinyan has recently expressed readiness to discuss a modified version, but under international control, though its acceptance by Baku is also controversial (4).
Borders and enclaves. Disputed Azerbaijani and Armenian enclaves, as well as border changes after the clashes in September 2022, also require further clarification for the parties. It is worth noting the official position of the Armenian authorities, particularly Pashinyan himself, who reiterates the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity according to the 1991 Almaty Declaration with an area of 86,600 km², which is an implicit message to Baku about the need to return the enclaves. But here arises a dilemma:
– Firstly, Azerbaijan will not agree to return Bashkend (Artsvashen), which is located at a strategic point and has an advantageous position.
– Secondly, the return by Armenia of Azerbaijani enclaves (in the direction of Gazakh: Yukhary Askipara, Sofulu, Barkhudarly; in the direction of Nakhchivan: Kyarki) will automatically mean the transfer under Azerbaijan’s visual control of the international highways (E001 and M2, M11, M17) passing through Armenian territory (5).
In addition, the Armenian Foreign Minister noted that the agreed agreement does not contain the area of the territories of both republics (6).
Return of forcibly displaced persons during Soviet times. In his statement, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that there is no clause in the agreed text about the mutual return of Armenians and Azerbaijanis that occurred during the USSR. This statement somewhat contradicts Baku’s official position on the need for Azerbaijanis and representatives of the Western Azerbaijan Community to return to their native lands. Recently, the program of the excuse of Azerbaijanis on historical lands also supported the Non-Aligned Movement organisation (7).

III. International factors
International dynamics, the crisis of bipolarity, and the collapse of the world order that has existed since World War II also play a key role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process.
Since the end of the 44-day war in the southwestern territories of Azerbaijan, there have been overt attempts by the EU, USA, and France to strengthen their influence in the South Caucasus. In this context, Azerbaijan, under President Aliyev’s leadership, prefers the concept of regionalism, opposing the intervention of third countries in regional processes. These principles have been publicly voiced by the Azerbaijani leader more than once.

In contrast, Armenia under N. Pashinyan’s leadership views cooperation with the West, represented by the USA, France, and the EU civilian mission, as “Plan B,” as evident from Pashinyan’s statements about possible integration with Brussels . For Iravan, the issue is not only about reducing Russian influence but also about diversifying its foreign policy course.
The strengthening of Armenian-Iranian cooperation and Tehran’s “understanding” position regarding Iravan’s attempts at European integration also give Armenia significant room for maneuver against Azerbaijan in the negotiation process.
Although the document on strategic partnership in 2025 between Iran and Armenia has not yet been signed, plans, recent trends, and statements by the Iranian ambassador in Iravan indicate such potential (8). Tehran’s categorical position will obviously complicate negotiations on the Zangezur corridor.

IV. Internal pressure and diaspora
Internal factors also significantly influence the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. In the domestic political arena, N. Pashinyan faces opposition, especially from revanchist groups (traditionally pro-Russian), who accuse him of “treason” due to the confidentiality of the agreement text, demanding that the details of the negotiations be made public. The authorities, in particular the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan, argue that the final decision on the place of signing the agreement with Azerbaijan has not yet been specified (9).

Externally, the Armenian prime minister is opposed by the global Armenian diaspora: both in the West and in Russia itself; actively speaking out against concluding the agreement under the current conditions.
By the way, one of the significant Armenian diaspora organizations with a radical position, ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America), located in the USA, also reacted extremely negatively to the news of the agreement on the peace treaty text (10).

Theses:
📌 The agreement on the text of the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia does not mean the end of the century-old ethno-political confrontation between Azerbaijanis (Turks) and Armenians. The Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process has merely transformed into another plane: now, most likely, the parties will exchange statements about the importance of concluding the agreed text of the peace treaty, having appointed a place for the event.

📌 Statements by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev show Baku’s desire to establish a real peace based on the principles of regionalism in the South Caucasus, in contrast to the intervention of the EU and France, as desired by the Armenian side.

📌 Despite significant positive shifts in the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiation process, there are hints from Iravan about cooperating with the EU civilian mission and, in general, in integration processes with Brussels as “Plan B.”

📌 The nature of the ineffectiveness of the hypothetical peace treaty between Baku and Iravan is also given by pressing issues:
– The issue of unblocking regional communications, particularly the Zangezur corridor.
– The issue of disputed Azerbaijani and Armenian enclaves on the conditional border.
– The issue of some territorial changes on the conditional border after the Second Karabakh War due to September clashes in 2022.

📌 Pashinyan’s diplomatic evasion regarding “concessions by Azerbaijan in the peace treaty text” may indicate both Baku’s categorical position and a desire not to exacerbate the peace agenda with open statements that could be misinterpreted as “provocative” by opposition circles and media.

📌 Statements by Annabella Baerbock and the German MFA about “bold concessions” by the Armenian side may mean agreement to compromises from Pashinyan for the sake of a principled resolution of the issue with the conclusion.

📌 N. Pashinyan, the Armenian prime minister, repeats the principles of the 1991 Almaty Declaration and the areas of the two Caucasian countries, which is also an implicit message to I. Aliyev about the importance of returning disputed territories on the conditional border.

📌 The Armenian opposition (including its revanchist part) will use the theme of the confidentiality of the agreed agreement text as one of the main arguments against Pashinyan’s team, accusing the head of the Armenian government and the current authorities of “treason.”

📌 The reaction of the Armenian diaspora shows that the Armenian community, both in the West and in Russia, does not want the signing of the peace treaty, which in turn confirms Azerbaijan’s position on the importance of changing the Constitution and preventing any attempts by revanchist forces in Armenia to destabilize the peace process in the strategic perspective.

📌 The strengthening and deepening of Armenian-Iranian cooperation and the upcoming signing of a document on strategic partnership between Tehran and Iravan will obviously give the Armenian side significant room for diplomatic maneuverability in the negotiation track with Baku.

📌 It is obvious that border incidents, as predicted in previous reports, will continue periodically. At the same time, the Azerbaijani side will perceive this as a provocation by the Armenian side, and the Armenian side will use it to achieve the establishment of a mechanism to control violations on the conditional border.

Forecasts:
🔘 It is more likely that such a situation between Baku and Iravan will last until 2026, when parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia.
🔘The forecast about the non-realization of signing the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the current calendar year remains relevant.
🔘A major war between Azerbaijan and Armenia is excluded. The most realistic scenario is direct local clashes.
🔘It would be too optimistic to expect the Armenian side to agree to the remaining two conditions of Baku. Rather, Iravan will offer Baku some additional conditions.

Sources:
1 FM Bayramov: Negotiations on draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan completed – https://azertag.az/en/xeber/fm_bayramov_negotiations_on_draft_peace_agreement_between_armenia_and_azerbaijan_completed-3461439

2 X post by Annabella Baerbock – https://x.com/ABaerbock/status/1900277269479759904

3 Armenia rejects Azerbaijani preconditions for signing peace treaty – https://oc-media.org/armenia-rejects-azerbaijani-preconditions-for-signing-peace-treaty/

4. Pashinyan: “Zangezur Corridor” is unacceptable to us – https://news.am/eng/news/871540.html

5. Հայաստանի ավտոմոբիլային ճանապարհներ – https://hy.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D5%80%D5%A1%D5%B5%D5%A1%D5%BD%D5%BF%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%AB_%D5%A1%D5%BE%D5%BF%D5%B8%D5%B4%D5%B8%D5%A2%D5%AB%D5%AC%D5%A1%D5%B5%D5%AB%D5%B6_%D5%B3%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%A1%D5%BA%D5%A1%D6%80%D5%B0%D5%B6%D5%A5%D6%80

6 Площади не указаны: Мирзоян о договоре с Баку и признании территориальной целостности – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20250314/ploschadi-ne-ukazany-mirzoyan-o-dogovore-s-baku-i-priznanii-territorialnoy-tselostnosti-86754590.html

7 New milestone in securing international support for right of Western Azerbaijanis to return – https://www.azernews.az/nation/240081.html

8 Իրանն ու ՀՀ-ն այս պահին աշխատում են համապարփակ ստրատեգիական գործընկերության փաստաթղթի վրա․ դեսպան – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKaYxP4i98Y

9 Почему не публикуется текст соглашения с Баку – комментарий секретаря Совбеза Армении – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20250320/pochemu-ne-publikuetsya-tekst-soglasheniya-s-baku–kommentariy-sekretarya-sovbeza-armenii-86954297.html

10 ANCA calls for actual peace amid reports of a one-sided Azerbaijan “agreement” being forced upon Armenia – https://armenianweekly.com/2025/03/14/anca-calls-for-actual-peace-amid-reports-of-a-one-sided-azerbaijan-agreement-being-forced-upon-armenia/