Alihüseyin Guluzade: Overcoming the “Crisis of Emotions” Between Russia and Azerbaijan. CIS Summit in Dushanbe

Overcoming the “Crisis of Emotions” Between Russia and Azerbaijan. CIS Summit in Dushanbe – October 2025

On the sidelines of the CIS summit in Dushanbe in October 2025, a long-awaited bilateral meeting between the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan took place, which will most likely serve to ease tensions in relations between Moscow and Baku. This objective material will provide a clear breakdown of events and the likely scenarios for the development of the situation.

Context

The summit of the CIS heads of state in a narrow format, held on October 10, 2025, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, became a platform—beyond its official agenda—for active efforts to normalize relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. These relations had been experiencing a period of tension linked to two key incidents: the crash of an AZAL aircraft in December 2024 and the arrest of employees of the Sputnik Azerbaijan media group (part of Russia Today) in Baku in June 2025, in the context of the killing and harsh detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis on Russian territory. The leaders of both countries were present at the summit, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. It was Putin who initiated the meeting with Aliyev by discussing the situation with the crash of the Azerbaijani airline AZAL’s plane. It is worth noting that this was the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries since the tensions arose.

De-escalation and Restoration of Trust

Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists in Dushanbe that there was no crisis in interstate relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, but rather a “crisis of emotions.” The Russian leader emphasized that if there had been a crisis in interstate relations, there would not have been the significant growth in trade and economic ties that, despite everything that happened, continued. He also stated that Azerbaijan could be considered a “Russian-speaking country,” as “…Russian is studied almost everywhere there.” Specifically, Putin apologized to Aliyev for the fact that the AZAL plane tragedy occurred in the skies over Russia (a de facto admission) and expressed condolences to the families of the victims. The Russian leader clearly explained the circumstances of the tragedy—the cause of the disaster was related to the presence of a Ukrainian drone in the sky, and that Russian air defense was “tracking” three such drones that had crossed the Russian border. Putin informed Aliyev that the airliner was most likely hit by debris, not by the warhead elements of a missile fired by the air defense system. The Russian side promised to provide a legal assessment of the actions of all officials and to do everything necessary regarding compensation. Aliyev, in turn, expressed special gratitude to Putin for the information provided and his confidence that the investigation would be objective.

Resolution of the Sputnik Azerbaijan Incident

On the eve of the Putin-Aliyev meeting, a decision was made to release the head of Sputnik Azerbaijan, Igor Kartavykh (who was arrested on June 30, 2025, against the backdrop of the killings of Azerbaijanis by Russian law enforcement in Yekaterinburg), and to change his pre-trial detention to house arrest in Baku. It should be noted that this decision was made thanks to negotiations at the level of presidential aides (Yuri Ushakov and Hikmet Hajiyev). In response, the Russian side released one of the Azerbaijani citizens detained on Russian territory. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told reporters that Russian diplomats in Baku had visited Kartavykh, who was receiving necessary assistance with the cooperation of the Azerbaijani side, given his health condition (he suffers from diabetes). Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan, Yevgeny Belousov, remained in custody.

Russia’s Position on South Caucasus Geopolitics and TRIPP

In general, Russia, which has repeatedly expressed its satisfaction with the absence of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has nevertheless not always been unequivocal, and in some ways has even directly expressed serious concerns about the easy implementation of the “Trump Route” (TRIPP). For instance, a few days before the start of the Dushanbe summit, on October 7, 2025, Vladimir Dzhabarov, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, stressed that Russia’s role in ensuring stability in the South Caucasus remains key, and without its participation, it would be impossible to resolve all the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Russian senator insisted that the future transport artery must be beneficial to all parties—both Armenia and Azerbaijan—and should not serve the interests of third countries (referring to the US). Dzhabarov also noted that Azerbaijan’s policy should not be seen as directed against Russia, as the Russian Federation understands that the young country must go through a difficult stage of development, and relations “will be restored sooner or later,” as the countries are destined to be neighbors.

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Meanwhile, parallel to these events, the Russian Ambassador to Armenia, Sergey Kopyrkin, stated that Russia still advocates for the continuation of regional dialogue within the “3+3” platform (Russia, Turkey, Iran + Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). He noted that Russia insists that the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides agree on the sequence for holding the 4th ministerial meeting before the end of 2025 in Baku or Yerevan.

Key Points

– Russia’s and Putin’s personal apologies to Azerbaijan and Aliyev, as well as the agreement to an objective investigation and the payment of compensation to Baku, are undoubtedly considered a victory for Azerbaijani diplomacy and a personal success for President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan. These events once again confirm the new realities that have taken shape in the South Caucasus, where Russia, as well as Iran and Turkey before it (in the context of resolving issues with Armenia), now take Azerbaijan’s interests into account.

– Although Russia’s and Putin’s personal apologies to Azerbaijan and Aliyev can indeed be characterized as a sign of Moscow’s weakness, on the other hand, it is also an indicator of Russia’s political rationalism and diplomatic flexibility, which may conceal a long-term strategic calculation.

– Putin’s statements about a “Russian-speaking Azerbaijan” do not fully correspond to reality, given the latest trends in Azerbaijan’s educational sphere regarding the shortage of Russian language and literature teachers. The question of the relevance of teaching or closing the Russian-language section in Azerbaijani public schools (which are generally free) is raised almost every year at the beginning of the school year. Additionally, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, a predominant part of Azerbaijan’s population, in the context of criticizing Russia’s actions, has also raised the issue of closing the Russian sections in schools or switching them to a fee-paying basis.

– In general, the theme of preserving the Russian language as a factor of Russia’s soft power in post-Soviet countries is not new. For example, during the summit period, the Russian Ambassador to Armenia, Sergey Kopyrkin, speaking in the Armenian capital, stated the importance of preserving the Russian language and its “colossal significance” for Armenia.

– Immediately after Putin’s apology, a majority of pro-government Azerbaijani media outlets (mainly those within the Global Media Group structure) published several articles where a softening of their position towards Russia was clearly discernible.

– It should be noted: the official Kremlin no longer uses the narrative regarding the relevance of the Trilateral Agreements of November 10, 2020, on unblocking regional communications (the Zangezur corridor) following the signing of the Washington Agreements of August 8, 2025, and the implementation of the TRIPP project. Instead, the Kremlin has activated the narrative of “taking into account the interests of the region’s countries in the implementation of geostrategic projects” and the “impossibility of implementing the TRIPP project by countries located far from the South Caucasus and across the ocean.”

– Overall, Russia’s apologies and rationalism can be characterized as an attempt to return relations with Azerbaijan to their previous level and to distance Baku from US influence, while simultaneously competing with the Armenia-US tandem in the South Caucasus.

Forecasts:

– In the short term (until January 2026), relations between Russia and Azerbaijan will continue to stabilize following the public resolution of the AZAL and Sputnik issues. Progress is likely to be made in agreeing on the venue and timing of the 3+3 meeting (in Baku or Yerevan).

– In the medium term (3 months to one year), Russia will continue to use its influence in regional mechanisms (e.g., 3+3) to slow down or revise the terms of the TRIPP project, insisting on its benefits for all regional players in order to limit US influence. Of course, this will depend on two significant factors: the situation (both military and political) in Ukraine (1) and domestic political scenarios in Armenia (2).

In the long term, Russia and Azerbaijan, being “doomed to be neighbors,” will maintain and increase trade and economic ties, while geopolitical rivalry over security issues in the South Caucasus, involving third countries (the US, Turkiye), will remain a constant factor.