Ali Hüseyin Guluzade: Visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the intensification of pro-Russian forces in Armenia

Visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the intensification of pro-Russian forces in Armenia (late spring 2025)

This report will review the results of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Armenia, as well as the parallel activation of pro-Russian forces in the domestic political arena in the context of the latest actions of former Armenian presidents and the leader of the Tavush for the Motherland movement.

I. Agenda of Russian-Armenian relations

On 20 May 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Iravan on a two-day working visit. On 21 May 2025, he held meetings with senior Armenian officials. In particular, in the morning, the Russian diplomat met with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and in the afternoon with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Vahagn Khachaturyan. (1)

After signing a programme of consultations for 2025–2026 between the diplomatic departments of the two countries (2), the foreign ministers held a joint press conference. A. Mirzoyan spoke about Armenia’s regional initiatives, emphasising the unrealised ‘full economic potential of the South Caucasus’ and calling for the unblocking of transport routes to stimulate trade. To this end, the Armenian diplomat once again presented the ‘Crossroads of Peace’ project as a plan to restore infrastructure links and ensure the common prosperity of the countries in the region (3).

Mirzoyan also downplayed the significance of rapprochement with the West, telling reporters that ‘Armenia has not applied for membership in the European Union, and no negotiations on this issue are underway’ (4). For his part, Lavrov emphasised the long-standing partnership between the countries, praising the ‘implementation of high-level agreements’ in the areas of trade and security, noting that trade turnover had reached $1.6 billion (5).

The Russian minister also announced that Russia plans to open a consulate general in Gafan to deepen ties with the southern provinces of Armenia. (6) Regarding the ‘Crossroads of Peace’ project, S. Lavrov agreed that Baku and Iravan must first sign a peace agreement in order to implement this project. (7)

In response to aggressive attacks by an Armenian journalist regarding the completed conflict in ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’, the Russian minister effectively confirmed the Kremlin’s (unrealised) plan to postpone a final decision on the issue to future generations (8).

II. Military-technical cooperation

With regard to security issues, Russia’s support for Armenia was noted in the context of its active participation in the activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), as well as the 30-year operation of the Russian military base No. 102 in Gyumri as the ‘cornerstone’ of the Caucasian country’s security (9). The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry hinted that the Kremlin had offered a CSTO observation mission after Azerbaijan’s attack on Armenia in 2022, but Armenia rejected it in favour of the EU Civilian Mission (10).

Lavrov also touched on the topic of arms purchases, acknowledging that Russia is having difficulty fulfilling old contracts due to the war in Ukraine and therefore ‘will not object to Iravan purchasing weapons from third parties.’ However, the diplomat warned that purchasing weapons from countries ‘openly hostile to Russia’ (France) raises questions about Armenia’s strategic course. (11)

***

At noon on the same day, Sergey Lavrov was received by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In his opening remarks, the Armenian prime minister spoke about the ‘current state of Armenian-Russian relations,’ while Lavrov thanked him and emphasised Russia’s readiness to ‘develop relations with Armenia.’ According to the official communiqué, the politicians discussed the bilateral agenda, cooperation within the EAEU and regional security issues. (12)

Later, at a meeting with teachers and students of the Russian-Armenian University, the Russian diplomat said that the West was trying to prevent the consolidation of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with their neighbours, effectively highlighting the importance of the concept of regionalism in the South Caucasus. (13)

***

On the day of Lavrov’s arrival in Armenia, activists from the pro-Western ‘For the Republic’ party staged a brief protest in Iravan, hanging large banners with the word ‘Murderer’ addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on a bridge and near the Russian embassy. Within a few hours, the Armenian police removed the banners, and Armenian officials later distanced themselves from the protest. (14)

The incident immediately drew condemnation in Moscow. Alexei Chepa, a senior official in the Russian State Duma, called the banner a ‘provocation’ and called on Iravan to punish the protesters ‘in the most severe manner.’ (15)

III. Robert Kocharyan’s big interview

On 19 May 2025, approximately one day before Lavrov’s arrival in Iravan, former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan gave an impressive interview to local media, in which he warned that Iravan’s current foreign policy line ‘risks losing everything.’ He called on the Armenian authorities to ‘stay away from the EU’ due to the inability of this political and economic community to resolve Armenia’s security issues, and instead to restore a ‘strategic partnership with Russia.’

Kocharyan added that Iran should also be part of this future alliance and went on to accuse Pashinyan of conducting a propaganda campaign aimed at ‘sowing distrust of Russia.’ (16)

On May 24, 2025, the Graparak newspaper, known for its proximity to government circles and insider information, published the news about the two -day visit of R. Kocharyan to Moscow, where a Kremlin official studying the domestic political situation in Armenia advised him to “show restraint” in Pashinyan’s impeachment.

The newspaper also added that Russia has recently increased its interest in Armenia’s domestic politics, and the Kremlin’s new curator on ‘Armenian issues,’ Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kirienko, is already studying the situation in the country. (17)

***

On 23 May 2025, Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Committee announced that it had formally charged third President Serzh Sargsyan. The third president of Armenia was accused of receiving bribes totalling approximately $2.985 million in 2008 in exchange for using his official position to facilitate a business deal. Prosecutors said the case was closed and would be referred to court. Sargsyan himself denies his guilt, and his team of lawyers promises to contest the charges. (18)

As for the disagreement with Kocharyan, Sargsyan noted in his statements that he would not oppose Kocharyan’s candidacy for the post of prime minister in the event of impeachment (of Pashinyan). (19)

IV. Bagrat Galstanyan’s plans

On 25 May 2025, in an interview with local media, the leader of the ‘Tavush – In the Name of the Motherland’ movement Archbishop and head of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) Bagrat Galstanyan (Srbazan) stated that he had been preparing people for street fighting for 3-4 months and that by 2026, elections should take place without the participation of the ‘Civil Contract.’ (20)

It is noteworthy that on 15 May 2025, the cleric announced a meeting with representatives of all political forces in Armenia, adding that meetings had already been held with representatives of the ‘Country for Life’ party, the ‘Ayakve’ civil initiative, political scientist Suren Surenyants, and representatives of the Yazidi community. (21)

On 27 May 2025, Garnik Danielyan, a deputy from the Armenia party, noted in a statement to journalists that Bagrat Galstanyan would announce further steps and large-scale protests in the coming days. (22)

***

Against this backdrop, it is worth noting the continued decline in Nikol Pashinyan’s approval rating. According to a poll by the Caucasus Centre for Research Resources (CRRC), 15% of respondents trust Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. At the same time, the ratings of former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are also low – 2% and 4% respectively; and 55% of respondents did not choose any political force at all. (23)

Conclusions and forecasts

🔘Lavrov’s visit to Armenia should primarily be assessed in the context of ‘synchronising watches’ and clarifying positions in bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia. The results of the visit once again confirm the thesis from the September article (24) about Armenia’s policy of balancing, but not an anti-Russian agenda in the foreign policy of Pashinyan’s government.

🔘The fact is that in the context of the political, economic and historical realities of Armenian statehood in the South Caucasus, any step towards diversification by the current Armenian leadership is mistakenly interpreted as ‘distancing itself from Russia’ or ‘anti-Russian rhetoric,’ although in reality it is nothing more than diversification in the domestic and foreign policy arena, where Russia has historically had the strongest leverage over Armenia.

🔘In addition, at least three factors support the thesis of diversification rather than ‘anti-Russian policy’ on the part of Pashinyan’s government: 1) the 102nd base of the Russian Armed Forces in Gyumri; 2) Membership in pro-Russian military-economic alliances (de jure in the case of the CSTO; de jure and de facto in the case of the EAEU); 3) Strong economic dependence on Russia.

🔘Against this backdrop, it is also worth noting the ‘political maturity’ and pragmatism of Pashinyan’s team, which has been in power for eight years. The events of recent years clearly show that the Armenian prime minister takes into account the geopolitical realities not only of the South Caucasus, but also of the world, trying to act in a neutral manner, balancing between the West and Russia.

🔘As for Russia’s position, Kocharyan’s increased activity, who is considered a strong candidate by most pro-Russian political groups, as well as reports of increased interest in Armenia on the part of Russian government officials, may indicate that despite its satisfaction with the results of Lavrov’s visit, the Kremlin still has a ‘spare card’ in its hands in case of emergencies.

🔘It should not be overlooked that Moscow still has a more active card to play in the form of AAC representative Bagrat Galstanyan, who appears to be promising impressive performances against the authorities. However, the success of such ‘marches’ is doubtful, given both Srbazan’s lack of political experience and the lack of novelty in his methods of struggle – it is doubtful that the cleric will be able to defeat Pashinyan with the power of the ‘street’.

🔘As for the support of the Armenian parties for the Tavush – In the Name of the Motherland movement, there have been no concrete steps taken so far, except for talk of impeachment. It is also unclear which political force or figure will be assigned a role in the event of a ‘hot’ phase of the movement. The fact is that since the last early parliamentary elections (2021), the Armenian opposition has not been able to form a centrist wing to counterbalance both pro-Russian and pro-Western forces.

🔘Another important point is whether it is in Moscow’s interests at this stage to ‘remove’ Pashinyan if the Armenian authorities are in fact cautious and more or less predictable for the Kremlin? Nevertheless, Russia’s intentions to open a consulate general in Kafan once again underscore its interest and desire to control the route passing through Armenian territory (with the help of the FSB). Moreover, like Iran, Russia also emphasises the importance of the concept of regionalism in the context of cooperation in the ‘3+3’ format.

Sources:

1 President Khachaturyan meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220285

2 Armenian, Russian foreign ministries sign consultations plan – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220222

3 Armenian, Russian FMs discuss opportunities of Yerevan’s Crossroads of Peace project – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220236

4 Armenia hasn’t made EU membership bid, says FM – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220253

5 Sergey Lavrov: Russia-Armenia trade reached $1.6bn last year – https://news.am/eng/news/883872.html

6 Идет работа по открытию российского консульства в Капане – глава МИД РФ – https://www.golosarmenii.am/article/237155/idet-rabota-po-otkrytiyu-rossijskogo-konsulstva-v-kapane-%E2%80%93-glava-mid-rf

7 Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace requires peace treaty with Azerbaijan, says Russia – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220450

8 Russia FM: Karabakh status issue resolution was planned to be put off until future generations – https://news.am/eng/news/883852.html

9 Лавров считает присутствие российской военной базы в Армении важным компонентом обеспечения безопасности страны – https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1220242

10 At Yerevan press conference, Armenian FM counters Lavrov’s claim about supposedly reacting to 2022 Azeri attack – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220230

11 Лавров: Армения сама может выбирать, у кого закупать оружие – https://tass.ru/politika/24004817

12 Prime Minister Pashinyan meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220289

13 Russia FM: West attempting to prevent consolidation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia with their big neighbors – https://news.am/eng/news/883900.html

14 Ոստիկանները հեռացրել են Պուտինի նկարով պաստառները – https://news.am/arm/news/883744.html

15 В Госдуме обратились к властям Армении из-за скандального плаката с Путиным – https://news.ru/cis/v-gosdume-obratilis-k-vlastyam-armenii-iz-za-skandalnogo-plakata-s-putinym

16 Telegram – Роберт Кочарян/Robert Kocharyan – https://t.me/robertkocharyanofficial/1259

17 РОБЕРТ КОЧАРЯН СОВЕРШИЛ КРАТКИЙ ВИЗИТ В МОСКВУ – https://hraparak.am/post/2393b66b16a2f91d14ff580801315a17

18 Очередное дело против Сержа Саргсяна передано в суд: его обвиняют в получении взятки – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20250523/ocherednoe-delo-protiv-serzha-sargsyana-peredano-v-sud-ego-obvinyayut-v-poluchenii-vzyatki-89302861.html

19 Саргсян заявил, что не против кандидатуры Кочаряна на пост премьера в случае импичмента – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20250521/sargsyan-zayavil-chto-ne-protiv-kandidatury-kocharyana-na-post-premera-v-sluchae-impichmenta-89200095.html

20 Архиепископ Баграт: Мы уже 3-4 месяца готовим людей к уличной борьбе – https://news.am/rus/print/news/884527.html

21 Баграт Галстанян анонсировал встречу с представителями всех политических сил – https://armeniatoday.am/politics-ru/internal-policy/745670/

22 Депутат от «Армения»: Лидер движения «Во имя Родины» в ближайшие дни объявит о масштабных акциях протеста – https://news.am/rus/news/884848.html

23 Pashinyan’s popularity keeps sliding, with just 15% trusting him – CRRC poll – https://jam-news.net/pashinyans-popularity-keeps-sliding-with-just-15-trusting-him-crrc-poll/