Ali Hüseyin Guluzade: Persian Motifs – Prospect of Protests in Iran (Late 2025 – Early 2026)

Iran is experiencing the largest wave of protests in the past three years, which began on December 28, 2025, due to an economic crisis that resulted in an unprecedented collapse of the national currency and multiple surges in inflation. But will this lead to the downfall of theocratic rule in Iran?

Context
Beginning with a strike by merchants and traders in Tehran’s bazaars on December 28-29, 2025, the new wave of protest movements rapidly escalated into a powerful uprising that has spread across more than 17 provinces, primarily in the central part of the country and in some major cities in the northeast and west.

Moreover, despite the initial role of merchants (a layer of Iranian society that has always played a significant role in domestic political processes), protest sentiment was quickly adopted by university students and youth, who expressed not only economic demands but also political slogans directed against the Islamic Republic.

Economic crisis as a catalyst
As mentioned above, the immediate cause of the protests was an unprecedented collapse of the Iranian rial and the revaluation of foreign currency by local merchants, concerned about market instability and potential bankruptcy. As a result, on December 28, 2025, the rial fell to a historic low of 1.45 million to one U.S. dollar (compared to approximately 430,000 rials in 2022).

It should also be noted that the annual inflation rate in Iran reached 42.2% in December 2025, with food and medicine prices rising by 72% and 50%, respectively. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), consumer prices in Iran rose 42.4% in 2025 and are not expected to fall below 40% in 2026.

Overall, among key causes, in addition to those listed above, the following factors can be identified:

– Poor management by authorities;
– Chronic budget deficits;
– Continuation of international sanctions caused by Iran’s nuclear program;
– Water and energy deficits (particularly the drying up of Lake Urmia);
– And of course, the consequences of the 12-day war with Israel.

Character of the current uprising
One of the most notable features of these protests is the rapid transformation from economic demands into political uprising. Slogans evolved from “Close the shops” and “Stabilize the exchange rate” to explicit calls for regime change – “Death to the dictator,” “Pahlavi will return,” “Long live the Shah.”

Another characteristic feature of the current uprising is a clear opposition to the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. For example, the slogan “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, my life is Iran” criticizes Iran’s support for its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas, suggesting redirecting state resources toward solving internal problems. Objectively, the failed policy of supporting the former Assad regime in Syria coupled with Shiite proxy formations in Lebanon and Yemen by Iran’s political elite is still harshly criticized by pro-government Iranian experts as well.

Pulse of the protest movement
The Iranian government initially attempted to balance recognition of the protests with the necessity of dialogue. President of the Islamic Republic Masoud Pezeshkian stated that one should not seek to blame America or “someone else” (Israel?!) for the current situation, and that the government bears responsibility in the current circumstances. The Iranian president also promised meetings with protest representatives. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, in an official statement, acknowledged the “constitutional right to peaceful protest.”

As for the clerical leadership, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also stated during his speech the right of protesters to legitimate demands, but warned insurgents of consequences in the event of attempts to destabilize the situation. It should also be noted that amid powerful anti-government uprisings, pro-government rallies were held in support of the Islamic Republic.

Nevertheless, beginning December 31, 2025, as the protests expanded and radicalized by the insurgents (burning of Qasem Soleimani monuments, desecration of the Quran, attacks on mosques and Shiite holy sites), which resulted in casualties on both sides, clashes between government militias (IRGC with “Basij”) and insurgents escalated to a more severe phase.

In Iranian Telegram channels affiliated with the IRGC, lists were published of arrests of sabotage agents linked to Mossad operations. Video footage was also distributed showing protesters from western provinces of the country (presumably of Kurdish origin) with weapons in hand, which, according to IRGC Telegram channels, were illegally smuggled across the Iraqi border due to lax customs control.

Parallel to this, the Iranian government made changes in the IRGC structure – Ali Fadavi, deputy commander of the IRGC, was replaced by Ahmad Vahidi, a harder and stricter cadre, and moreover loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This may indicate the willingness of the Islamic Republic’s government to take a harsher approach to suppressing the protests.

Also noteworthy are telephone conversations between Iranian President M. Pezeshkian and Russia’s Vladimir Putin during the days of protests, as well as reports of Russian cargo aircraft departing into Iranian airspace.

Trump’s statements and Iranian authorities’ response
It should be noted that the massive demonstration of discontent is accompanied by international tension, in particular the U.S. operation in Caracas to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Notably, according to reports, the Islamic Republic suffered losses in connection with this.

Regarding the uprisings in Iran, American President Donald Trump on January 2, 2026, in his Truth Social post threatened intervention in case of violent suppression of protests by Iranian authorities, which in turn provoked a sharp response from the leadership of the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian top political leadership, in turn, immediately responded with counter-threats. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, accused the United States and Israel of inciting the protests and warned that interference in Iran’s internal affairs would lead to chaos throughout the region and create threats to American interests. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf threatened strikes on American bases in the Middle East. In turn, adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Shamkhani, addressing the topic of possible U.S. intervention, noted that any attempt at (foreign) intervention would be firmly suppressed. Similar statements were also made by President of the Islamic Republic Masoud Pezeshkian, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned Iran’s enemies on the X (Twitter) social network of the consequences.

Theses and forecasts:
– Despite the organization of the current uprisings and broad coverage among various classes of Iranian society, in the event of continuation of current trends, the protesters currently have no direct indications of protest success, let alone the fall of the Islamic Republic.

– Protesters still lack a clearly defined leader, but in addition to this, uprisings remain localized mainly in the central part of the country and also in some densely populated cities in the east and west.

– Iranian provinces, predominantly populated by ethnic Turkic (Azerbaijani) and Kurdish groups, also show no activity in the current protests, which also negatively affects positive prospects for the insurgents.

– Nevertheless, the economic crisis could become the defining problem for the Islamic Republic in 2026 and beyond. Because unlike nuclear negotiations or regional Middle East conflicts, which theocratic government can manage through diplomacy or military force, economic collapse directly affects the daily lives of ordinary Iranians.

– Moreover, the historical significance of merchants’ participation in the protests cannot be overestimated. It was the bazaar merchants who played a key role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, helping to mobilize the population, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the monarchy.

– One cannot exclude the fact of non-intervention by Azerbaijani Turkic provinces centered in Tabriz (the Turkic factor), which historically have played the role of an impetus for tectonic changes in the history of Iranian statehood.

– The factor of Azerbaijanis’ non-intervention in the current protests may also be influenced by the Turkic ethnic origin of the current president Masoud Pezeshkian, who enjoys popularity not only among Iranian Azerbaijanis (est. 35-45 bln of people) but also in neighboring Turkic states – Turkey and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the figure of Shah Pahlavi is quite negative for Azerbaijani Turks due to historical and domestic political reasons of the monarchical era.

– Existential US intervention or a new direct clash between Israel and Iran amid protests remains, but is associated with high regional risks in the Middle East and could lead to unpredictable consequences.