On March 31, a telephone conversation was held between Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Masoud Pezeshkian, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I

The official readout of the telephone conversation emphasized that was the mutual exchange of congratulatory messages between the presidents on the occasion of Ramadan. However, it is particularly noteworthy that, alongside the festive greetings, the two heads of state also discussed bilateral relations, especially in the context of the intensifying military rhetoric from the #US towards Iran. It seems likely that Iran anticipates the attacks from the U.S.-#Israel alliance to be continuous rather than a one-time occurrence. Strikes against Iran could evolve into a long-term campaign, employing updated elements of covert operations, military strategies, and intelligence capabilities.

It is probable that Iran is facing increasing challenges in negotiating its nuclear program with the United States. #Iran is also assessing potential U.S. responses, its coordination with Israel, and the possible role that #Azerbaijan may play within this strategy.

Recognizing the persistent and systematic nature of its current foreign policy challenges, Iran views cooperation with Azerbaijan as a unique opportunity to address its vulnerabilities. Following the diplomatic phone conversation, the visit of Masoud Pezeshkian’s foreign policy adviser, Mehdi Sanayi, to Azerbaijan may serve as an additional indication of this strategic mind.

II

Azerbaijan is opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, as the addition of a new nuclear state in the region could trigger a new and more dangerous phase in geopolitical confrontations. #Russia and #China’s cautious stance on Iran’s nuclear program provides Azerbaijan with alternative maneuvering space. However, Azerbaijan does not offer its territories as a frontline against Iran’s rivals.

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan would consider the eliminate of Iran’s nuclear weapons program as a favorable development. As a result, Azerbaijan’s efforts to regulate its relations with both the U.S. and Israel in the context of a changing global order raise concerns in Tehran. Iran understands that Azerbaijan will not jeopardize its strategic partnerships with the U.S. and Israel for the sake of the Iran factor. In this context, Iran’s primary concern is how to respond to a potential campaign against it, and it is likely that Tehran is seeking certain security guarantees from Azerbaijan. This issue is not solely related to the U.S. and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan, but also reflects Iran’s anxieties about Azerbaijan and #Turkiye’s growing influence within Iran.

III

In an effort to deter the U.S. from striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, Tehran continues to threaten #Washington with military operations in the Middle East. However, even if these verbal threats are translated into action, they are unlikely to yield any synchrony that would grant Iran a strategic advantage in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Iran no longer possesses the strength or capacity to instigate proxy operations in the South Caucasus (the situation in Georgia is somewhat different). As a result, Iran is no longer able to impede the process of normalization between #Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is primarily driven by Azerbaijan’s conditions and demands.

Consequently, Iran’s capacity to resist the Zangezur Corridor, a key strategic project for Azerbaijan, is diminishing. Armenia’s recent expansion of military provocations along the Azerbaijan border, coupled with the risk of large-scale escalation, may be addressed during discussions between Baku and Tehran.

Agshin Karimov